Sir Nick Harvey, formed Minister for Armed Forces (2010-2012), is CEO of European Movement UK.
The return of Donald Trump to the White House has been a wake-up call for European capitals. His ambivalence towards NATO, transactional alliances, and ‘America First’ agenda mean Europe—including the UK—can no longer rely on its transatlantic partner as it once did. For Britain, the question is simple: will we help shape Europe’s security, or watch from the sidelines? This will be key when Keir Starmer meets EU leaders in Brussels later today.
If we are serious about defending our interests and global influence, we must move quickly to strengthen our defence ties with the EU. Closer cooperation is not just in Britain’s interest—it is in Europe’s interest too. The EU gains as much from UK expertise, military capabilities, and intelligence-sharing as Britain does from being integrated into European security frameworks.
As a permanent UN Security Council member, a nuclear power, and a leading NATO force, Britain should be central to European defence. Yet, since leaving the EU, Britain has remained conspicuously absent from key European defence initiatives, even as security threats mount. This is a strategic mistake.
The geopolitical landscape has changed dramatically since the Trade and Cooperation Agreement was negotiated. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped European security. We need to be responsive to these changes.
There is no contradiction between deepening European defence cooperation and maintaining NATO as the foundation of our security. A stronger European defence pillar strengthens NATO, particularly when a future US administration may be unwilling to come to Europe’s aid. Finland and Sweden’s NATO accession underscores the value of both partnerships.
Later today, leaders must discuss concrete steps to strengthen security cooperation. As part of these discussions, several key measures should be considered to strengthen UK-EU defence ties.
First, entering into a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) with the European Union would enable the UK to participate in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions on a case-by-case basis. The CSDP has become an increasingly important pillar of European defence, with missions designed to enhance Europe’s crisis management capabilities, improve regional security, and contribute to international peacekeeping efforts. Britain was once an active participant and led Operation Atalanta, which tackled piracy off Somalia’s coast and remains critical in safeguarding international shipping routes. Given the UK’s naval strength, re-engaging in would be a logical step. Also, reintegrating into Operation Althea, would help boost a crucial role in stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the wider Balkans.
Second, signing an Administrative Agreement with the European Defence Agency (EDA) would open up possibilities for the UK to join Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects. PESCO is an EU initiative designed to enhance defence collaboration between member states, focusing on critical areas such as military mobility, cyber defence, artificial intelligence for military applications, and cutting-edge surveillance technology. These projects promote joint capability development, ensuring European forces can operate more efficiently together.
Countries including the United States, Canada, and Norway already participate in select PESCO projects. Britain, with its advanced defence industry and military expertise, should seek entry into relevant projects. The EDA plays a crucial role in coordinating European defence cooperation, and excluding the UK from these initiatives weakens both British and European security.
Third, the UK has already demonstrated its willingness to work with European allies through the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a UK-led rapid reaction force made up of Nordic and Baltic allies. Given Russia’s persistent threats to European stability, JEF should be expanded in both scope and operational readiness, incorporating additional countries—most notably Poland.
At the same time, the EU has actively encouraged greater collaboration between member states in defence research, development, and procurement. However, as a third country outside the single market, the UK is largely excluded from these schemes. This is a significant oversight. If the UK and EU are to strengthen their security cooperation, any new agreement must include provisions allowing Britain to take part in these vital defence initiatives. The EU has much to gain from UK expertise and capabilities, and this must be recognised in negotiations. Enhanced access to British-led research and industrial development would significantly boost Europe’s defence innovation and technological edge.
Failure to act now would be reckless. If Britain stands aside as Europe deepens its defence ties, we risk weakening our own security and marginalising ourselves in future strategic decisions.
In an uncertain world, our defence cooperation with the European Union should be as strong, if not stronger, than the partnerships our NATO allies—including the United States, Canada, and Turkey—already maintain with the EU. A security Agreement that formalises British participation in European defence initiatives is overdue.
This is not about choosing between the EU and NATO. It is about facing the reality of a shifting global order where Europe must take responsibility for its own defence. The UK must not only be part of this effort—it must help lead it.
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